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**USSR: Signs of Political Action by Andropov**

*General Secretary Andropov apparently is now actively pursuing his political goals, despite his illness.* [ ]

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Radio Moscow yesterday conveyed the impression that Andropov took an active part in Thursday's regular meeting of the Politburo. The meeting approved the 1984 draft plan and budget to be submitted for final approval at a Central Committee plenum and Supreme Soviet session later this month. [ ]

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A Politburo session in late November took measures to carry out its decision in July to institute a system of political indoctrination units in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In the last week of November, the Soviet press announced that a Moscow food supplier, arrested a year ago for large-scale illegal practices in dealing with elite customers, had been sentenced to death. [ ]

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Belorussian party authorities this week announced the dismissal of the chief of the Republic's Internal Affairs Ministry, his deputy, the deputy prosecutor, and a member of the supreme court. They had failed to act after learning that five suspects in a murder case had been wrongly convicted. [ ]

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In addition, a party decree published this week in *Pravda* contains an unusually strong attack on the party leadership in Moldavia—the former region of Politburo member Chernenko—for bureaucratic inertia and foot-dragging. The decree ignores the Republic's good industrial performance during the past year. [ ]

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**Comment:** Andropov evidently is now well enough, despite his four-month absence from public view, to attend to regular business, to continue his campaign against corruption, and to maneuver against his erstwhile rival, Chernenko. The recent actions are all logical extensions of the General Secretary's anticorruption drive, which appeared to have been stalled until mid-November. It was then that Soviet officials began to assert privately to their Western contacts that Andropov was making decisions and conducting business while he recuperated. [ ]

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**LEBANON: New Cease-Fire**

*The latest cease-fire in Lebanon is unlikely to hold unless progress is made soon on outstanding security and political issues.*

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The cease-fire went into effect at noon local time yesterday but was interrupted less than one-half an hour later by machinegun and mortar fire in the airport area. According to a Druze spokesman in Damascus, negotiations are continuing to arrange for the disengagement of some forces in the Beirut area and the Shuf.

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The press in Beirut reports that the Foreign Ministers of Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia will meet in Damascus this weekend to determine the date and venue for resuming the national reconciliation conference. Opposition leaders have stated, however, that they will not participate in a new round of talks until a firm cease-fire is established.

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President Gemayel yesterday made an unscheduled visit to Libya for talks with Libyan leader Qadhafi.

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**Comment:** The cease-fire agreed to last September collapsed because of the close proximity of combatants, the absence of any effective policing mechanism, and the lack of progress on political issues. Even if an agreement is reached on security issues, renewed violence is inevitable if political discussions again become stalled.

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Gemayel's visit to Libya appears to have been arranged with the help of Morocco's King Hassan. Qadhafi has good relations with Syrian President Assad and provides some military assistance to Druze leader Junblatt.

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Gemayel may have hoped to persuade Qadhafi to use his contacts to diminish Syrian-instigated pressure against his government. He may also have made the visit to demonstrate some degree of independence from the US.

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**USSR-SYRIA-LEBANON: Soviet Reaction**

*Soviet military and political reaction thus far to US attacks on Syrian positions in Lebanon has been limited.* [redacted]

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Soviet media reaction, meanwhile, to both the US shelling of Syrian positions and US special envoy Rumsfeld's visit to Damascus has been routine. [redacted]

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The USSR is likely to portray the visit by special envoy Rumsfeld, as they have previous visits of US envoys, as an attempt to weaken Syria's resolve. The Soviets privately have long been concerned about these contacts, which Damascus evidently has not discussed in detail with Moscow. [redacted]

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**BELGIUM: INF Basing Complications**

*Slippage in the housing construction schedule at the Florennes INF site is the latest sign that Belgium will continue to have difficulty meeting its deadline of March 1985 for INF deployment.* [ ]

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Belgian officials, following lengthy delays, have told the US Embassy that the Cabinet has tentatively decided to award a large construction contract at Florennes to a Walloon firm. The Belgians could not guarantee, however, that the firm would complete the housing by next June, when the first contingent of support personnel is to arrive. [ ]

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**Comment:** Belgium has not yet made a final decision to deploy INF, and economic benefits for Wallonia are an integral part of the government's strategy for winning acquiescence in deployment. The haggling over construction contracts reflects the tensions between Wallonia and Flanders that usually affect major projects in Belgium.

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The Ministry of Defense is trying hard to keep deployment preparations on schedule, but the probability of more construction delays will make it difficult for Brussels to meet the deadline for making cruise missiles operational at Florennes. [ ]

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Timely Belgian deployment is necessary to counter the impression that there are built-in pauses in the INF basing process. Substantial Belgian delays would prolong the 9- to 12-month period during which West Germany would be the only continental country continuing with basing. When initial Italian deployments are completed in March, Italy will not base more cruise missiles until late 1985. A lengthy Belgian delay, coupled with continued Dutch procrastination, would increase public pressures on Bonn to request some slippage in Pershing II deployments. [ ]

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**SOUTH AFRICA-UN: Diplomatic Initiatives**

*South Africa's proposal to withdraw its troops from Angola is an effort to calm the coming debate on Angola in the UN and to reopen bilateral negotiations with the Angolan Government.* [ ]

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In a message to the UN Secretary General on Thursday, Foreign Minister Botha proposed to withdraw South African troops from southern Angola on 31 January in exchange for assurances that Cuban, Angolan, and SWAPO troops would not exploit the withdrawal. South Africa proposed a 30-day "disengagement of forces" that could be extended. Botha stated that Pretoria was ready to proceed with the Namibian independence process, if a solution could be found to the issue of Cuban troops in Angola. [ ]

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Pretoria has attempted to reopen bilateral discussions with Luanda recently, according to the US Embassies. Negotiations for a mutual disengagement of forces broke down early this year following a major SWAPO incursion. [ ]

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**Comment:** Pretoria's move reflects earlier South African concern that its permanent military presence in southern Angola may lead to a crisis in South Africa's dealings with the US. In addition to calming the Security Council debate, Pretoria hopes to shift the focus from its military presence in Angola to the Cuban withdrawal issue. [ ]

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**CYPRUS-UN: Status of UN Force**

*Turkish rejection of a UN resolution renewing the mandate for UN peacekeeping troops in Cyprus probably means that the Turkish Cypriots will gradually curtail the operations of UN forces in the north.*

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The Security Council on Thursday unanimously passed a resolution that extends until June the stationing of the force on Cyprus. The resolution also requests the Secretary General to continue his efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem and asks the disputants to cooperate with the UN force. Greece and Cyprus have accepted the terms of the new mandate.

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Turkish diplomats at the UN, however, have rejected the resolution—primarily because it mentions the “Government of Cyprus.” The Turkish Cypriot representative has informed the US Mission at the UN that his leaders will continue to cooperate with the UN force as long as the Greek side does not “create difficulties.”

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**Comment:** Neither the Turkish Cypriots nor Ankara want to break contact with the UN forces in Cyprus or restrict its operations to the UN buffer zone on the island at this juncture. They do not share the Greek view of the importance of the UN force, however, and over time the Turkish side could start seeking pretexts for reducing its presence in the north.

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The Greek Cypriots probably are relieved that the UN force's mandate has been renewed. Nicosia nevertheless almost certainly believes that the West—and particularly the US—did not try hard enough to bring the Turks along on this matter.

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Greek Cypriot dissatisfaction is bound to intensify the already strong criticism of President Kyprianou for allowing the US to use Larnaca airport in resupplying US troops in Lebanon. Kyprianou has ignored this pressure so far, but, if he cannot soon show the public that helping the US on Lebanon is paying dividends on the Cyprus issue, he may be forced to reassess his policy.

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**WEST GERMANY-NICARAGUA: Suspension of Aid**

Press reports state that the West German Economic Aid Ministry has suspended development aid to Nicaragua, citing the need for improvements in its political situation, presumably a call for easing Sandinista repression. This action affects just over \$14 million, or nearly all the West German Government aid budgeted for Nicaragua in 1983. Although Economic Aid Minister Warnke had told US officials in October that he foresaw no cutoff in aid to Nicaragua, he has advocated shifting Bonn's aid toward states with a pro-Western orientation. [ ]

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**Comment:** The suspension is a further modification of Bonn's policy toward Central America. Last month West Germany announced a resumption of development aid for El Salvador and nominated an ambassador to San Salvador after a two-year absence. The surprise cut in aid to Nicaragua probably is the result of the growing influence of conservatives willing to align Bonn's policies with those of the US in Central America and other areas where Bonn recognizes the primacy of US interests. They may use the decision to blunt any criticism by the US of post-INF initiatives in improving East-West ties. [ ]

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**EL SALVADOR: Contention Over Land Reform**

Supporters of the country's land reform probably are not as disappointed with the new constitution as they have publicly indicated. According to US Embassy reports, moderate elements in the Constituent Assembly have opposed new wording on controversial land reform articles prepared by the rightists led by extremist Roberto D'Aubuisson. The articles, which passed by a slim margin, reduce by about one-half the amount of land to be redistributed under Phase II of the land reform, according to opposition officials. Leaders of the peasant unions indicate they may boycott the presidential election next year in protest. [ ]

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**Comment:** Although the articles are a political victory for the rightists, they represent progress on a part of the land reform that has been suspended since 1980 and that some Salvadorans thought was completely dead. The unions probably are more concerned over the pending termination of Decree 207, the land-to-tiller program, which allows peasants to claim several acres that they farm for someone else if they live on it. This decree is due to expire on 31 December and, if not extended, will deny thousands of peasants an opportunity to own land. [ ]

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**POLAND: Few Violent Clashes**

Police intimidation and a widely shared consensus that violent protests would be futile appear to have limited the size of most demonstrations yesterday—the 13th anniversary of the workers' protests in Gdansk, Gdynia, and Szczecin and the second anniversary of the killing of the miners in Wujek. Lech Walesa, who earlier in the week had given his long-awaited program to Western journalists, sent his wife to lay flowers at the Solidarity monument in Gdansk. The regime, meanwhile, has temporarily postponed the implementation of food price increases that had been scheduled for 1 January.

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**Comment:** Many Poles showed their defiance by such symbolic acts as attending mass. Their actions were consistent with Walesa's belief that demonstrations that lead to clashes with the police are not useful to his cause. The tone of his program, however, was sharper than last year, accusing the authorities of failing to grasp that Poland's problems can be resolved only by working with society. The postponement of the price increases probably until late January or early February is clear evidence of the regime's nervousness and will only encourage the opposition.

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**SOUTH KOREA: New Army Chief**

President Chun this week appointed a close associate who helped him gain power to the position of Army chief of staff. General Chong took charge on Thursday, despite indications that Chun would postpone top Army changes in order to stabilize command arrangements in the aftermath of the Rangoon bombing.

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**Comment:** Officer corps sentiment against the previous incumbent and in favor of a regular turnover of top military positions probably helped persuade Chun to appoint Chong now. Chun also may have decided to remove the former chief because of his criticism of the President. The new chief, an experienced commander, was the most logical choice and will be acceptable to the Army.

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **LEBANON: Status of Reconciliation Efforts**

*Progress toward national reconciliation in Lebanon is unlikely in the near future. Since the breakup of the Geneva conference six weeks ago, the attitudes of the participants have hardened. Druze and Muslims are dismayed by improved US-Israeli relations and by the US use of firepower. They are convinced that Washington is no longer interested in pressing President Gemayel to deal with their demands for political reforms and the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Gemayel will attempt to avoid concessions on the key issues in order to buy time, hoping that the US eventually will come up with a strategy to save his government.*

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During the past week, the Gemayel government has tried to build support for another round of talks. Gemayel met with key members of the parliament, and his advisers have indicated he has been consulting on forming a government of national unity and hopes to reconvene reconciliation talks soon. In addition, government representatives have met with opposition leaders and Syrian officials in Damascus.

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Gemayel hopes to mollify the opposition by bringing key factional leaders into a national unity government under his leadership. Opposition leaders, however, are unlikely to participate in such a government until he is willing to accommodate their principal demands.

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Factional tension has intensified in recent weeks because of persistent cease-fire violations in the mountains and a general deterioration in security around Beirut. Neither the Christians nor their Muslim and Druze adversaries are in a mood to compromise. Despite the cease-fire announced yesterday, sporadic fighting is likely to continue through the winter.

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### **Druze and Muslim Views**

The Syrian-supported National Salvation Front, led by Druze leader Walid Junblatt, and Shia leader Nabih Barri still insist that Gemayel address the issue of Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon before any progress can be made on reconciliation. They are angry that Gemayel returned from Washington without a US commitment to urge Israel to accept modifications of the Lebanese-Israeli accord of last May on troop withdrawal. They are dismayed that the US instead announced improved strategic coordination with Israel.

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Druze and Shias view increased US willingness to use firepower against them as evidence that the US is siding with the Christian-dominated government against them. Junblatt is afraid of a confrontation with US forces. He recently made limited conciliatory gestures toward the US to forestall military operations against the Druze. [ ]

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This conciliatory attitude, however, does not extend to the Lebanese Government or to the Christian militia forces, which many Druze and Shias believe are waging a campaign of violence against them. Recent incidents—including the assassination of an important Druze religious leader, a car bomb explosion near a West Beirut hospital, and a rash of kidnappings—have deepened anti-Christian sentiments. [ ]

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Nabih Barri probably would prefer a more conciliatory approach to Gemayel and the US. Government neglect of Shia problems and the increasing militancy of the Shia community, however, are forcing him to adopt a tougher position. [ ]

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Barri is struggling to contain the influence of radical pro-Iranian Shias within his Amal movement. He realizes that a conciliatory gesture on his part in talks with the government could jeopardize his leadership of Amal and make him a target of Shia extremists. [ ]

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### **Christian Perceptions**

Christian leaders Pierre Gemayel and Camille Shamun were dissatisfied with the results of the Geneva conference and are likely to be even less ready to compromise if the talks resume. Their fundamental concern—that political reforms would strip the Christians of political power and create a Muslim state—remains unchanged. [ ]

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Most Christians are now more confident that US or Israeli military action will put pressure on Syrian and Palestinian forces to withdraw from Lebanon, thereby weakening the Druze and Muslim opposition. In addition, many Christians are encouraged by the release of at least 1,500 militiamen of the Christian Lebanese Forces from the besieged town of Dayr al Qamar. This will significantly improve the fighting strength of the Christian militia. [ ]

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The deteriorating security situation also is hardening Christian resolve. Christians are particularly angered by the Druze forces' resumption of shelling of predominantly Christian East Beirut and by numerous recent bombings of Christian businesses and churches. [ ]

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The increasing violence is also helping extremist rightwing elements to gain ascendancy in the Christian community. [REDACTED]

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### **Outlook**

If opposition leaders reject President Gemayel's overtures, he probably will gradually attempt to consolidate the government's area of control. He recognizes that he will need US assistance to do so. [REDACTED]

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Gemayel's recent moves are designed in part to convince the US that he is doing all he can to achieve national reconciliation and that his government is gaining broader political support. He probably believes that this will encourage the US to use its forces to help the Lebanese Army reestablish government control over the greater Beirut area and possibly along the Alayh ridgeline. [REDACTED]

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